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Abstract: In a multi-level, non-hierarchical court system, where courts at the upper echelon do 
not have the power to reverse the decisions of courts at the lower level, judicial cooperation 
appears crucial to the effectiveness of the higher-level law. For this reason, the recent 
judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, which declared the decision of the Court of 
Justice in the Landtová case ultra vires, would seem to deal a terrible blow to the authority of 
European Union law. As doomsayers will be quick to point out, the Czech decision could set a 
dangerous precedent that may well one day bring down the entire edifice of EU law. However, 
borrowing insights from game theory and international relations, the present article argues that 
this judgment is more likely to remain an isolated episode than to be remembered as the 
tipping point when tensions between the CJEU and domestic courts escalated into the judicial 
equivalent of nuclear Armageddon. The author shows that many aspects of the jurisprudence 
of constitutional conflict can be represented as a simple Hawk-Dove game. A modified, 
slightly more sophisticated model then helps cast a wider light on the use of non-compliance 
threats by domestic high courts, notably the German Federal Constitutional Court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL DIALOGUE OR JUDICIAL WAR? 
 
On 31 January 2012,1 the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC) declared the decision 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Landtová2 an ultra vires 
act. In what might otherwise look like a mundane case about the pension rights of 
workers from the defunct Czechoslovakia, the Czech constitutional judges, sitting 
in full court, concluded that the CJEU had wrongly applied EU regulation 
1408/71 on the coordination of social security schemes (Coordination 
Regulation)3 to facts devoid of any no cross-border dimension. The pension 
controversy arose from a time when Czechs and Slovaks were citizens of one and 
the same State. By disregarding that fact the CJEU had apparently made itself 
guilty of the worst kind of historical revisionism. In the CCC’s words:  
 
The failure to distinguish legal relationships arising from the dissolution of 
a state with a uniform social security system from legal situations resulting 
from the free movement of persons within the European Communities, or 
the European Union, as it applies to the social security systems of its 
Member States, is a failure to respect European history, it is comparing 
matters that are not comparable.4 
 
Pointing to the doctrinal position it had articulated in its first ruling on the Treaty 
of Lisbon,5 the CCC went on to say that the Luxembourg Court had overstepped 
the boundaries of the powers transferred to the European Union by the Czech 
Republic: 
 
                                                     
1 Judgment of 31 January 2012, announced 14 February 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII. 
The English translation is available at the CCC’s website, http://www.usoud.cz/view/6342. 
This Article, however, relies on Jan Komárek’s translation in Jan Komárek, Playing with Matches: 
The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires, C. M. L. 
REV. (forthcoming). 
2 Judgment of the CJEU (Fourth Chamber) of 22 June 2011 in Case C-399/09 Landtová, not yet 
officially reported.  
3 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families 
moving within the Community, English special edition of the OJ: Series I Chapter 1971(II) p. 
416.  
4 See supra note 1 at 13.  
5 Judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. ÚS 19/08, Lisbon Treaty I. English translation available on 
the CCC’s website, http://www.usoud.cz/view/pl-19-08 (accessed 25 May 2012). For an 
analysis of the judgment see the Case Comment by Petr Bříza, The Czech Republic: The 
Constitutional Court on the Lisbon Treaty Decision of 26 November 2008, 5 EUR. CON. L. REV. 143 
(2009).  
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[W]e cannot do otherwise than state, regarding the effect of the European 
Court of Justice judgment of 22 June 2011, C-399/09 on similar matters, 
that in this case a European Union body acted in excess of the law, 
resulting in a situation where an act enacted by a European body 
overstepped the powers which the Czech Republic had transferred to the 
European Union by virtue of Article 10a of the Constitution; the act 
ignored the limits of the powers thereby delegated and was thus ultra 
vires.6 
 
On the face of things, the CCC’s judgment, by declaring an EU act, namely a 
ruling of the CJEU, ultra vires, constitutes a momentous and unprecedented display 
of judicial defiance. Surely, relations between the European Court and domestic 
supreme and constitutional courts have been fraught with tensions and conflict 
almost from the beginning. But, to my knowledge, no domestic court has ever 
taken this step before in a final judgment on the merits, at least not in so explicit a 
manner.7 In a non-hierarchical court system, where courts at the upper echelon do 
not have the power to strike down the decisions of courts at the lower level, 
judicial cooperation appears to be essential to the effectiveness of the higher-level 
law. So, by defying the authority of the Court of Justice in such blatant fashion, 
the CCC’s judgment may be viewed as striking a terrible blow to the authority of 
EU law. As doomsayers will be prompt to assert, the Czech decision may be seen 
as setting an ominous precedent, which, were it to spread to other Member States, 
could ultimately bring down the whole edifice of EU law.  
However, borrowing insights from game theory and international relations, 
this article argues that this judgment is more likely to remain an isolated episode 
than to be remembered as the tipping point when tensions between the CJEU and 
domestic courts escalated into the judicial equivalent of nuclear Armageddon. I 
submit that many aspects of the ‘jurisprudence of constitutional conflict’8 can be 
represented as a simple Hawk-Dove game. I then attempt to show that a modified, 
slightly more sophisticated model helps cast a wider light on the use of non-
compliance threats by domestic high courts, and notably by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (GFCC). The game-theoretic analysis demonstrates, 
convincingly in my view, that a domestic court need not ‘bite’ in order for its 
‘barking’ to be consequential. Far from an indication of strength, the decision to 
                                                     
6 See supra note 1 at 13. 
7 Going back more than 30 years, the Cohn-Bendit ruling of the French Conseil d’Etat is probably 
the decision that comes closest to qualifying as a precedent. It challenged the Court of Justice’s 
doctrine on the direct effect of directives but avoided a direct showdown with the judges in 
Luxembourg by setting aside the reference for a preliminary ruling ordered by the lower 
administrative court. See Decision No. 11604, 22 December 1978, Dalloz (1979) 155. Had the 
Conseil d’Etat allowed the reference and confronted the Court of Justice, it is doubtful, though, 
that it would have used the language of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and ultra vires, which had yet to 
become part of European legal discourse. 
8 To borrow an expression coined by Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, EUR. L. J. 173 (2006). 
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disapply EU law may in fact constitute evidence of a domestic court’s institutional 
weakness, which suggests the CCC will sooner or later repudiate a decision that 
seems to be driven by anger rather than by reason. While ultra vires doctrines have 
proliferated in the wake of the GFCC’s Maastricht ruling, I highlight key 
institutional limitations that national courts must reckon with when seeking to 
import the GFCC’s jurisprudence into their own domestic context. 
The Article is organised as follows. Section II reviews the literature on the 
role of national constitutional and supreme courts in European legal integration. 
In my view, both legal scholarship and the political science literature on European 
judicial politics have failed to produce a convincing narrative adequately capturing 
the nature of inter-judicial conflicts in the EU multi-level judicial system. I argue, 
in particular, that the concepts of ‘judicial dialogue’ and ‘constitutional pluralism’ 
are poor tools to analyse the kind of interactions at work between the Court of 
Justice and domestic high courts such as the CCC and the GFCC. While correctly 
capturing some of our intuitions about the operations of the European multi-level 
legal system, they go little distance to identifying the interests, ideas and 
constraints that drive the observed pattern of conflicts between domestic and 
supranational judges. Section III then presents my alternative game-theoretic 
approach together with the broader theory of judicial behaviour in which it is 
grounded.9 Drawing parallels with the Cold War and conflict situations in 
international relations, I model inter-court relations in a multi-level, non-
hierarchical setting, where judges have antagonistic interests, as a simple Hawk-
Dove game. I use this simple model to discuss two fundamental parameters 
shaping inter-judicial interactions in the European context: the cost of domestic 
defiance for national and supranational judges, and the power and institutional 
stature of domestic courts, which vary widely across Member States. Domestic 
high courts do not all have superpower status. Nor do their decisions pose the 
same systemic threat to the Luxembourg court’s authority. Section IV sets out a 
more sophisticated model that seeks to address judicial signalling, i.e. the use of 
non-compliance threats by domestic courts. Incorporating incomplete information 
and communication, the iterated inter-court game helps elucidate numerous 
aspects of the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict hitherto unaccounted for. 
Not least among them is the GFCC’s rich case law on integration. I suggest that 
GFCC-CJEU relations can be meaningfully analysed as a ‘coexistence’ or, from 
the GFCC’s perspective, ‘containment’ equilibrium. While it often had little choice 
but to acquiesce to the CJEU’s expansionary jurisprudence, the German court has 
nonetheless managed to exert considerable influence on the European court and 
on the development of EU law. Crucially though, it has achieved this without ever 
disapplying an EU act. Instead, it has used its obiter dicta as a signalling device to 
                                                     
9 See Arthur Dyevre, Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of 
Judicial Behaviour, 2 EUR. POL. SC. REV. 297–327 (2010). 
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flag issue areas where it saw its interests as being more fundamentally at stake. 
Section V concludes with brief considerations on the direction of future research.  
 
 
II. LEGAL INTEGRATION STUDIES AND THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 
 
Law scholars have underlined both the growing acceptance of supremacy and 
direct effect on the part of national judges since the 1960s and the points of 
disagreement that nonetheless persist between the CJEU and national courts.10 A 
careful perusal of this literature shows that some scholars have been willing to 
venture beyond pure doctrinal analysis to consider the institutional incentives of 
national judges.  
In what remains one of the most influential essays ever written on legal 
integration,11 Joseph Weiler, for one, developed the classic Judicial Empowerment 
Thesis. Thanks to EU law, courts that had previously been denied the power to 
control the legality of certain state acts, such as statutes, were able to acquire this 
prerogative. According to Weiler, by establishing what was in effect a system of 
decentralised judicial review, supremacy and direct effect combined with the 
Simmenthal doctrine12 emerged as a promise of empowerment, which in turn 
explains why these courts were particularly keen to cooperate with the Court of 
Justice.  
Other authors have focused on the more conflictual aspects of legal 
integration, seeking to elucidate why some higher courts have shown more 
resistance to the federalist implications of Van Gend en Loos13 and Costa v. ENEL14 
– the decisions that have become the cornerstones of the ‘constitutionalisation’ of 
European law. Their analysis typically emphasise the role orientation of domestic 
courts. They contend, for example, that because constitutional courts view the 
                                                     
10 THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS - DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL 
CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., 1998); MONICA CLAES, THE 
NATIONAL COURTS’ MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION (2006); THE NATIONAL 
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE ECHR AND EU LAWS: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino, 2010). 
11 Joseph Halevi Horowitz  Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, YALE L.J. 2403–2483 (1991). See 
also Joseph Weiler, A Quiet Revolution, 26 COMP. POL. STUDIES 510–534 (1994). 
12 The Simmenthal doctrine states that each and every national court has the duty and, therefore, 
the authority to disapply domestic legislation when incompatible with EU law, see Judgment of 
9 March 1978, Case C-106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] 
E.C.R. 629, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 263. On the Simmenthal doctrine see CLAES, supra note 10, at 69–
118.  
13 Judgment of 5 February 1963, Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie de 
Belastingen, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R 105.  
14 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R 585.  
                           2/2013 
 
 6
protection of the national constitution as their paramount mission, they are more 
inclined to resist legal integration than other domestic courts.15  
Nevertheless, two concepts have come to dominate the scholarly debate on 
inter-judicial relations. The first is the notion of ‘judicial dialogue’.16 As should be 
expected from a concept that was initially intended as a metaphor, what scholars 
mean by judicial dialogue is often unclear. The idea, though, seems roughly that 
the development of the integrated European legal order results from the constant 
interplay of domestic and supranational courts or, at least, that it should be so. 
‘Constitutional pluralism’ is the catchphrase that is supposed to capture the other 
dominant paradigm of contemporary EU law scholarship.17 Like ‘judicial dialogue’, 
it has both descriptive and normative connotations and tends to be similarly ill-
defined. In brief, despite integration and far-reaching judicial cooperation, national 
and supranational judges continue to operate on the basis of distinct constitutional 
foundations, in the knowledge that the non-hierarchical character of the system 
prevents any level from absorbing the other. What seems primarily a descriptive 
(and in itself hardly disputable) statement is then given a normative twist: So is the 
European legal system and so it ought to be. Scholars thus call on judges to 
respect pluralism and to show deference.18 
Fashionable and popular as these ideas (theories?) are, they do not fare very 
well as positive account of what judges do. This Article is hardly original in noting 
that there is very little that resembles a dialogue in the tension-ridden relationship 
the Court of Justice has developed with the GFCC or the Polish Constitutional 
Court (PCC), at least if by ‘dialogue’ we mean something akin to a conversation 
among gentlemen seeking the truth through arguments based on reason.19 In any 
case, the dialogue metaphor falls short of adequately capturing the complex 
                                                     
15 Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order, THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
LAW 177–213 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Búrca, 1999); ANNELI ALBI, EU ENLARGEMENT AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2005); CLAES, supra note 10. 
16 See e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Typology of Transjudicial Communication, A, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 
100 (1994) (presenting judicial dialogue as a pervasive feature of legal integration in Europe). 
See also the contributions in SHAPING RULE OF LAW THROUGH DIALOGUE: INTERNATIONAL 
AND SUPRANATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Filippo Fontanelli et al., 2010). 
17 See CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Matej Avbelj & 
Jan Komárek, 2012) (featuring a collection of essays both embracing and criticising 
constitutional pluralism). 
18 See Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 
6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008); Armin von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate 
Say: On the Relationship Between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
397 (2008); Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action, 
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 501–537 (Neil Walker, 2003). 
19 KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 38 (2001) (criticising the use of the dialogue 
metaphor in EU scholarship); Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decreee: International Review 
of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004) (arguing that there is a growing pattern of 
interactions between international and domestic courts for which 'dialogue' constitutes an ill-
suited analogy). 
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strategies, interests and calculations that seem to be at work in supranational-
domestic judicial relations. The notion of constitutional pluralism proves equally 
inadequate when it comes to explaining the dynamic character of inter-judicial 
interactions. True, we are dealing with courts that do not share the same ultimate 
reference point. But what determines the conditions of coexistence of these plural 
legal orders? That the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict has remained 
something of a puzzle to the scholarly community thus comes as little surprise.   
Even so, I see this deficiency as stemming from a more general failure to 
ground these legal narratives in a well-developed theory of judicial motivation as 
well as from problems inherent to the methodology (or, more exactly, the lack of 
it) of legal scholarship. In explaining the positions of judicial actors, legal scholars 
typically emphasise legal logic and the application of legal principles while glossing 
over political and strategic considerations.20 Admittedly, most do acknowledge that 
judging is not impervious to political influences. But this recognition generally 
comes with a blanket qualification that it is only one factor among many others; 
that other social scientists are wrong to underestimate the role of doctrines in 
judicial decision-making and that, anyway, ideological determinants are inseparable 
from legal ones.21 
Political scientists, for their part, have displayed more interest in the extra-
legal determinants of judicial behaviour. However, they have focused their 
attention on the more harmonious aspects rather than the tensions in the 
operations of the EU multi-level legal system. Efforts have focused on explaining 
how and why national courts have been willing to help the CJEU further 
European integration through its activist jurisprudence.22  
Karen Alter’s influential study on the establishment of EU law supremacy23 
stands out as one of the rare social science studies focusing on the more 
conflictual aspects of legal integration. Tracing the reception of the ECJ’s case law 
by French and German judges from the early 1960s to the late 1990s, her research 
shows how domestic courts in two founding Member States have gradually altered 
their doctrines to accommodate supremacy and direct effect while seeking to keep 
the CJEU’s activist tendencies in check. Her analysis rejects the dialogue 
metaphor, to which she prefers the term of ‘negotiation’24 and points to the 
                                                     
20 I emphasise the word ‘typically’ here, as there are of course, and as acknowledged above, some 
notable exceptions, Weiler’s work being not the least of them. 
21 See e.g. CLAES, supra note 10, at 247 (claiming that legal variables play a more important role in 
judicial decision-making than commonly assumed by social scientists). 
22 Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 
47 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 41–76 (1993); ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004); Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests and 
Institutions: Constructing the EC’s Internal Market (1993); Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior 
Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435–
452 (2008); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute 
Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63–81 (1998). 
23 ALTER, supra note 19. 
24 Id. at 38. 
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importance of ‘access rules’ as constraint on the behaviour of judicial actors.25 Her 
research is also commonly associated with the Court Competition Thesis. Taking 
Weiler’s Empowerment Thesis further, she claimed, in short, that EU law creates 
opportunities for lower courts to circumvent their judicial hierarchy through the 
twin doctrines of primacy and direct effect and the preliminary ruling 
mechanism.26 Though undeniable, Alter’s contribution is nonetheless wanting in 
two respects. For one, her institutional theory of judicial motivation proves rather 
thin and underspecified when we try to deploy it beyond her two case studies. For 
another, she has little to say about the strategy judicial actors follow or are likely to 
follow when they engage in multi-level negotiations. While convincingly showing 
that legal doctrines are indeed the currency of inter-judicial negotiations, she does 
not quite succeed in determining when they will prove effective and when not. 
While seeking to address the broader theoretical shortcoming identified in the 
legal and political science literatures by drawing on an ambitious attempt to 
develop a general theory of judicial behaviour,27 the analysis that follows focuses 
on the strategic question. Which I try to clarify by bringing insights from game 
theory and international relations to bear on our understanding of inter-judicial 
relations in the EU. 
 
 
 
III. OF HAWKS, DOVES AND CHICKEN: THE LOGIC OF INTER-
JUDICIAL CONFLICTS IN THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
 
The theoretical argument developed in this Section rests firmly on the view that 
judicial behaviour is driven by more than a simple concern for the correct 
application of legal rules – judicial rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Assuredly, the game-theoretic approach adopted here presumes that a court’s 
behaviour may, at least in certain circumstances, depend on how other judicial 
actors position themselves on the issue at hand. But this is far from being the only 
extra-legal factor shaping judicial behaviour in the EU multi-level judiciary. 
The factors shaping judicial decision-making can be grouped into micro-, 
meso- and macro-level determinants,28 as in Table 1. Following this general theory 
of judicial behaviour, lower-level determinants are nested within higher-level ones, 
meaning that lower-level variables affect judicial outcomes only when higher-level 
variables take a certain value or remain below or above a specific threshold. For 
example, variations in the judges’ ideological outlook – a micro-level determinant 
                                                     
25 Id. at 179. 
26 Karen Alter, Explaining National Courts Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS - 
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 232 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., 1998). 
27 Dyevre, supra note 9. 
28 Id. 
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– will have little effect on judicial outcomes when and where political 
fragmentation and public support for the courts – both macro-level determinants 
– are low. Accordingly, if both the public and government parties are strongly pro-
integration, whether domestic judges are Europhiles or Eurosceptics should have 
little impact on the courts’ position regarding integration, since courts in such 
situation will have scant latitude to depart from pro-integration policies anyway. 
As we shall see, the same logic underpins the assumptions of the game-theoretic 
model presented in this Section. Indeed, one of my basic assumptions is that the 
position of government parties on integration places an upper bound on the level 
of defiance domestic judges can realistically sustain. 
  
Level of Analysis Explanatory Variables 
Macro-Level Political fragmentation, public support 
Meso-Level 
    
Position in judicial hierarchy, power to review legislative 
acts, access rules, discretion over case selection, term 
renewability, term duration, separate opinions, opinion 
assignment rules, etc. 
 
Micro-Level Policy-preferences of individual judge 
 
Table 1. Determinants of Judicial Behaviour 
 
In addition to political fragmentation and public support, the influence of judicial 
ideology may be further limited by meso-level factors such as access rules, the 
court position in the judicial hierarchy, and so on. Admittedly, no inquiry into the 
attitude of domestic judges towards the European project can ignore the position 
these judges occupy in the domestic court hierarchy. For the purpose of the 
present essay, I focus on the highest rung of the Member State judicial systems. In 
line with the Court Competition and Empowerment Theories, I assume that 
domestic high courts have incentives and interests that potentially diverge from 
those of inferior courts. More specifically, I assume that a court that (a) already 
holds the power to disapply legislative enactments under domestic law and (b) has 
the authority to review or at least to exert significant influence on the decisions of 
lower courts will have both less to gain and more to lose from legal integration. I 
believe that, other things being equal, courts fitting this definition are likely to view 
the expansion of EU law with a less favourable eye. 
Just as the hierarchical structure of the court system – however reconfigured 
by the integration process – constitutes a crucial element of the relationship of 
high court judges with their peers at the lower echelons of the domestic judicial 
pyramid, it is the absence of such a hierarchical component that characterises 
national courts/CJEU relations. Since the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict 
is in large part a consequence of the non-hierarchical makeup of the European 
                           2/2013 
 
 10
multi-level judicial system, it is hard to overstate the importance of this 
institutional characteristic. Assuredly, if the Treaties had granted the CJEU power 
to invalidate domestic judicial decisions or the CJEU had been able to arrogate 
such power for itself, courts like the GFCC or the French Conseil d’Etat might well 
not have contemplated the thought of defiance in the first place.29 Nor, arguably, 
would EU scholars have spilled so much ink over the issue. 
Other meso-level factors, such as the rules governing access to the judicial 
forum and the power to invoke core constitutional values against EU law, also 
play a crucial role in accounting for cross-national disparities in the influence 
wielded by domestic high courts on the operations of the multi-level legal system, 
as we will see below. For the time being, though, these elements should suffice to 
give us a sense of how the game-theoretic argument fits in a broader theoretical 
understanding of judicial behaviour. 
 
 THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 
 
The use of game theory to model judicial behaviour is first motivated by the 
understanding that judging has a strategic dimension. Similar to other public 
decision-makers, judges are aware that their decisions can trigger adverse 
reactions. Legislators may respond to their rulings by passing override legislation 
or by stripping the court of its jurisdiction. A new case law may spur either over- 
or under-litigation. Moreover, judges who do not themselves sit at the top of the 
judicial heap may have to count with the appellate or supreme court, which may 
reverse their determinations.30 Thus, in order to advance their interpretation of the 
law or any other policy goal, judges must anticipate the social response elicited by 
their own behaviour; just as other agents – be they litigants, politicians, or other 
judges – are likely to anticipate their rulings. Game theory proves a precious and 
powerful analytical tool precisely in those situations where, as with the CJEU and 
domestic high courts, human agents do not act upon purely parametric 
considerations but seek to guess each other’s intentions and to anticipate each 
other’s moves. 
Having said this, a survey of the game-theoretic literature on judicial 
behaviour suggests it offers few insights that are directly applicable to the issue 
                                                     
29 In the United States, the US Supreme Court had been explicitly vested with the power to 
reverse the state court decisions by Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act. A prerogative the 
Marshall Court first put to use against Virginian courts, see Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 
U.S. 603 (1813) (Story, J.) and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (Story, J.). What 
arguably looked like a natural implication of federalism was nonetheless initially resisted by 
many state judges, see LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 14–42 (2001) (comparing patterns of 
resistance to federal authority across branches in the United States and the European Union). 
30 The seriousness of these threats and, therefore, the need to anticipate them will of course 
depend on the macro- and meso-determinants discussed above. 
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that forms the main concern of this article.31 The only game-theoretic model 
specifically addressing EU judicial politics32 treats the ECJ as a mere fire-alarm 
mechanism with no policy-making powers of its own. Worse still, it entirely leaves 
out domestic courts and the role they play in enforcing EU law. To be fair, some 
models do address inter-court interactions. Yet all without exception presume that 
the interacting courts stand in a hierarchical relationship to one another. Geared to 
the US context, they are intended to explain how lower courts may effectively 
escape the higher courts’ oversight33 and, conversely, how higher courts can 
maximise compliance in the face of limited resources to monitor the behaviour of 
lower courts.34 Precisely because they assume a hierarchical relationship (the 
higher court has power to reverse lower court decisions), these models prove 
inadequate when it comes to analysing judicial behaviour in non-hierarchical 
configurations. An irremediable flaw in the EU context.  
Interestingly enough, the way in which this Article proposes to conceptualise 
the interaction puzzle arising from the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict is 
more commonly found in the international relations literature, where the Hawk-
Dove game is classically used to model conflict situations between states.35 
  
1. STRUCTURE OF THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 
 
The Hawk-Dove game is a classic game form, also known as ‘Chicken’ and less 
commonly as ‘Snowdrift’ game. Many, presumably, know the game of Chicken as 
the game in which two drivers drive towards each other in a collision course, with 
the last to swerve counting as the winner.36 The game typically serves to illustrate a 
situation where each player prefers not to yield while knowing the worst outcome 
will occur if both players refuse to do so. 
In the Snowdrift variant of the game, the two drivers no longer face a car 
crash but, instead, find themselves trapped on opposite sides of a snowdrift. Each 
                                                     
31 For a literature review see Arthur Dyevre, Game Theory and Judicial Behaviour, STUDIES IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 115 (Wojciech Zaluski & Jerzy Stelmach, 
2011). 
32 Clifford J. Carrubba, Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes, 67 J. OF POL. 669–
689 (2005). 
33 See Charles Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the 
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101–116 (2000). 
34 Jeffrey Lax, Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of 
Four, 15 J. THEOR. POLITICS 61–86 (2003). 
35 See Anne E. Sartori, The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International 
Disputes, 56 INT’L ORGANIZATION 121–149 (2002); Whereas discussion of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in its various forms abound in American legal scholarship, mention of Hawk-Dove is 
rare. For an exception see Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An 
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 (2003). 
36 A famous example, which no good presentation of the game will fail to mention, is found in 
the drama film Rebel Without a Cause, where the character of Buzz Gunderson challenges Jim 
Stark to a ‘Chickie Run’. (Note, though, that in the movie the cars hurtle towards a cliff instead 
of racing into each other.) 
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has the option of staying in her car or of picking a shovel to clear a path through 
the snow. Exactly as in the Chicken variant, each player is best off when she does 
not yield (i.e. stays in her car) and the other does (shovelling the snow from a path 
both will be able to use) while worst off when none of them yield (each player sits 
in her car until frozen to death). 
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Figure 1. Payoff Matrix of a Hawk-Dove Game. Notes: Payoff for Player 1 
appears in the lower-left corner of each cell while payoff for Player 2 appears in 
the upper-right. V is the value of the contested resource and C the cost of an 
escalated conflict, incurred when both players play Hawk. It is assumed that
0>> VC . 
 
Hawk-Dove has the exact same payoff structure as these two games, which means 
all three are strictly identical from a mathematical and game-theoretic point of 
view. The only difference lies in the example that traditionally serves to introduce 
them, which betrays their original fields of application. In the Hawk-Dove game, 
the two players compete over a resource and have to decide whether to fight (play 
hawk) or to acquiesce (play dove). From the payoff matrix given in Figure 1, we 
see that the players must share the value of resource  when both play dove, with 
each player accruing payoff 

. If one player acts as a hawk while the other acts a 
dove, she receives the whole value of the resource  and the other player receives 
nothing. When both players play hawk, they have to share the resource  but also 
pay the cost  of an escalated fight, resulting in a payoff  . Thus, for each 
player, the best outcome is, of course, when she plays hawk and the other player 
acts a dove, while the worst outcome sees both players choosing to act as a hawk.  
  
Arthur Dyevre                                        Domestic Judicial Non-Compliance in the European Union  
 
 13
While used in biology to explore the logic of animal conflict,37 this game form 
has become a staple of the international relations literature, where it is commonly 
employed to analyse crisis situations, such as nuclear brinkmanship during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.38 The typical study question being: What strategy should a 
country adopt, knowing that it will incur severe losses if it acquiesces to the 
demands of its neighbour but knowing at the same time that a war would be even 
more costly? 
 
2. APPLYING THE HAWK-DOVE GAME TO JUDICIAL INTERACTIONS IN THE 
EU MULTI-LEVEL LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
Two reasons motivate the choice of this specific game form to model judicial 
interactions in the EU legal system. The first follows from the nature of 
jurisdiction as a rivalrous good. Certainly, we can imagine situations where, in 
reconfiguring domestic politics, supranational integration expands the relative 
influence of the judicial branch to such an extent that the expansion ends up 
benefiting all courts. But in the scenario that interests us here, courts on opposite 
sides of a jurisdictional dispute typically have opposite institutional interests, just 
like the two players in a Hawk-Dove game.39  
The second analogy with the Hawk-Dove game pertains to the potential 
consequences of an escalated conflict. For the CJEU, a single case of overt non-
compliance by an influential domestic court may, by setting a precedent, damage 
its authority and undermine the effectiveness of EU law. But putting a threat of 
non-compliance to execution may attract problems to domestic judges, too. A 
ruling that comes to be regarded as detrimental to the country’s interests and 
membership in the EU may trigger adverse political reactions. Legislators may 
decide to punish the unruly court by rolling back its jurisdiction, changing its rules 
of procedure, appointing new judges, etc..  
On that score, it is worth remembering that a group of respected German 
academic lawyers reacted to the GFCC’s ruling on the Lisbon Treaty – which 
                                                     
37 See JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). 
38 See STEVEN J. BRAMS, SUPERPOWER GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO SUPERPOWER 
CONFLICT (1985). 
39 In other words, we assume (a) that courts want to expand – or at least preserve – their 
jurisdiction and (b) that whenever one court expands its jurisdiction, it normally does so at the 
other’s expense. (a) is a common assumption in the judicial politics literature, see e.g. GEORG 
VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY (2005); Michel Troper 
& Véronique Champeil-Desplats, Jalons Pour Une Théorie Des Contraintes Juridiques, THEORIE DES 
CONTRAINTES JURIDIQUES, BRUXELLES/PARIS: BRUYLANT/LGDJ 11–23 (Michel Troper et 
al., 2005). Note that assumption (b) suggests a parallel between constitutional courts and 
national parliaments in that both appear to be inevitable “victims” of the integration process, 
see Arthur Dyevre, The French Parliament and European Integration, 18 EUR. PUB. L. 527 (2012). 
Students of international law have documented a growing pattern of frictions between 
international and domestic courts in other contexts too, see Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting 
Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 493 (2011); Ahdieh, supra note 19. 
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stopped short of holding the Treaty unconstitutional but was nonetheless regarded 
as articulating a strongly Eurosceptic position40 – by calling on legislators to 
amend the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassunggerichtsgesetz). The 
proposed amendment41 would have required that the GFCC send a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice before entering any judgment on the ultra 
vires character of an EU act. Had it become law, the amendment would certainly 
have dealt a severe (albeit not quite fatal) blow to the GFCC’s institutional 
standing. 
More generally, despite growing disenchantment with the EU among ordinary 
voters, government parties in the Member States, even the more Eurosceptic ones, 
usually agree about the fact of EU membership.42 This entails that domestic courts 
can ill-afford to make decisions that would imperil their country’s full membership 
in the supranational club. In our view, this fact places an upper limit on the level 
of defiance domestic judges can realistically afford. The doctrines of direct effect 
and supremacy are now part – though not necessarily in the form expounded by 
the CJEU in its jurisprudence – of the acquis communautaire. Thus, unless the 
government parties wish to leave the EU, a court that blatantly defies it will face a 
political backlash.  
 
  
                                                     
40 See discussion in Section IV below. 
41 The text is available at 
http://www.euractiv.de/fileadmin/images/Denkschrift_EuGH_BVerfG_2009_Aug.pdf 
(accessed 29 March 2012). 
42 See OPPOSING EUROPE? THE COMPARATIVE PARTY POLITICS OF EUROSCEPTICISM: VOLUME 
1: CASE STUDIES AND COUNTRY SURVEYS (Paul Taggart & Aleks Szczerbiak, 2008); 
OPPOSING EUROPE? VOLUME 2: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Aleks 
Szczerbiak & Paul A. Taggart, 2008). 
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BLUFF AND BRINKMANSHIP IN THE JUDICIAL COLD WAR 
 
1. BEST STRATEGY AND EQUILIBRIUM CONCEPT 
 
Pictured in Figure 2 is the payoff matrix of the jurisdictional conflict modelled as a 
Hawk-Dove Game.  
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Figure 2. Jurisdictional Conflict Modelled as a Hawk-Dove Game. Notes: 
 
is the value of the jurisdictional gain and  is the cost of a constitutional conflict, 
incurred when the two courts choose judicial defiance. I assume 


 < −
 (judges 
prefer jurisdictional loss to constitutional crisis). 
 
What is the optimal behaviour to adopt in such a conflict situation? To form what 
game theorists call a ‘Nash equilibrium’, a strategy profile must be a player’s best 
response to the other player’s best response, such that no player may want to 
depart unilaterally from the resulting outcome. Restricting the analysis first to pure 
strategies, we find two strategy profiles that satisfy this definition. Given that a 
constitutional crisis is a worse outcome than a jurisdictional loss (

 < −), a 
domestic court’s best response to a hawkish Court of Justice is judicial restraint. 
Yet its best response to a dovish CJEU is hawkish judicial expansion or 
reassertion. Remarkably, when we “solve” the game in this way, using only pure 
strategies, equilibrium behaviour never results in a constitutional crisis. 
Although it is easy to see to that each court would prefer the equilibrium 
where it is the hawk and the other court is the dove, strategic decision-making is 
rendered difficult by the fact that no court has a dominant strategy. That is, a 
strategy that remains the best whatever strategy the other court happens to 
choose. Under the assumption that the courts are acting simultaneously rather 
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than sequentially,43 each court must somehow guess what the other is going to do. 
That entails playing dove in the anticipation the other court will play hawk, and, 
vice versa, playing hawk if it is expected to choose dove. The only answer to that 
problem within the game is to adopt a mixed strategy randomizing among pure 
strategies. A pair of mixed strategies constitutes a mixed strategy equilibrium if 
they are mutual best responses.44 Applying this solution concept, a constitutional 
crisis would have some probability of actually occurring, depending on the 
magnitude of the cost attached to a constitutional crisis relative to the value of a 
jurisdictional gain.45 
 
Figure 3. Relative Cost of Constitutional Conflict and Probability of 
Escalated Conflict. Notes: Relative cost of constitutional conflict is defined as 
                                                     
43 When played sequentially, the game yields an obvious result: The court moving first chooses 
hawk, then, observing this, the other court is left with no choice but to play dove or else incur 
the cost of a constitutional crisis. When the game is repeated infinitely many times, though, 
playing the game sequentially does not necessarily entail this result, see infra IV.B. 
44 In short, players must play each strategy probabilistically, so as to make the other player 
indifferent between choosing one or the other (the expected payoff from one strategy must 
equal the expected payoff from the other). In our game, if  (0 <  < 1) and  (0 <  < 1) 
are respectively the probability with which the Court of Justice and the Domestic Court play 
dove, this condition is satisfied when  and   . (   because payoffs are 
symmetrical.) To give a numerical example, assuming that   10 and   50, the two courts 
would play dove with probability 

 and hawk with probability 

. 
45 This is the joint probability of both courts acting as a hawk: 1 −  ∙ 1 −   1 −  ∙
1 − . In the numerical example above, this would happen with probability 

 ∙ 

 

. 
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 − 3 (in order for it to increase, cost  must increase relatively more than 
jurisdictional gain ). 
 
Other things being equal, the probability of an escalated judicial war will go down 
as the relative cost of a constitutional crisis goes up, as depicted in Figure 3. For 
low values, the courts will want to play hawk more often, as the prospect of a 
jurisdictional gain ( whenever the other court acts as a dove) largely compensates 
for the risk of conflict (

  whenever the other court also happens to play hawk). 
On the other hand, for very high values, the probability of an escalated conflict 
will approach zero, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of the Cold War doctrine 
of Mutual Assured Destruction when applied to the European legal context: 
effective deterrence means courts will cooperate most of the time and judicial wars 
will be very rare. 
 
2. DETERRENCE, SUPERPOWER STATUS AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
 
Surely, I am not the first to invoke the Cold War analogy in the context of 
European legal integration. Some years ago, in commenting the GFCC’s Maastricht 
decision, Joe Weiler and Ulrich Haltern observed: 
 
According to this analogy [the Cold War analogy], the German decision is 
not an official declaration of war, but the commencement of a cold war 
with its paradoxical guarantee of mutual co-existence following the 
infamous MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) logic. [...] For the German 
Court actually to declare a Community norm unconstitutional, rather than 
simply threaten to do so, would be an extremely hazardous move so as to 
make its usage unlikely. If other Member State courts followed the 
German lead, or if other Member State legislatures or governments were 
to suspend implementation of the norm on some reciprocity rationale, a 
real constitutional crisis would arise in the Community – the legal 
equivalent of the Empty Chair political stand-off in the 1960s. It would be 
hard for the German government to remedy the situation, especially if the 
German Court decision enjoyed general public popularity. Would the 
German Federal Constitutional Court be willing to face the responsibility 
of dealing such a blow to European integration, rather than just 
threatening to do so? Maybe not, but the logic of the Cold War is that 
each side has to assume the worst and to arm as if the other side would 
actually deal the first blow. The ECJ would then have to watch over its 
shoulder the whole time, trying to anticipate any potential move by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court.46 
                                                     
46 Joseph Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-Through the Looking 
Glass, 37 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 411, 445–446 (1996). 
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This fits rather well with our game-theoretic approach. But, more importantly, it 
points to two implications of the Hawk-Dove model presented here on which I 
would now like to dwell in more detail.  
The first follows from the seemingly paradoxical finding that escalated 
judicial wars are more likely when the institutional cost associated with a 
constitutional crisis is perceived to be relatively low. Here too, the Cold War 
analogy applies in full. Indeed, while the existence of massive stockpiles of tactical 
and strategic nuclear weapons made war between the USA and the USSR virtually 
impossible, it did not prevent military escalations between them and lesser military 
powers (such as North Vietnam and Afghanistan). Similarly, I believe that an all-
out war is less likely to occur with a judicial superpower like the GFCC than with a 
less powerful judicial institution like the CCC. Indubitably, domestic high courts 
differ widely in institutional stature, powers and international influence. At one 
end of the spectrum lies the GFCC as Europe’s mightiest domestic court. With 
multiple ways to access the Court (abstract review, concrete review, individual 
complaint...), broad jurisdiction and doctrines that afford it a high level of 
discretion over case selection, the GFCC enjoys more control over its agenda than 
any other European judicial body. This in turn enables it to closely monitor 
jurisprudential developments at the supranational level while overseeing the 
application of EU law by domestic judicial actors. What is more, the GFCC’s 
institutional prominence extends beyond German borders. Its jurisprudential 
edicts, especially on European integration, are closely followed in other Member 
States and enjoy broad international media coverage. To that extent and as Weiler 
and Haltern rightly notice, the GFCC potentially represents a systemic threat for 
the European Court and the effectiveness of European law in a way other 
domestic courts do not, or at least not to the same extent.  
At the other extreme of the institutional spectrum, we find courts that are so 
severely constrained in their procedural and policy-making powers that they 
cannot really articulate credible non-compliance threats. Because the UK lacks a 
formal constitution, the UK Supreme Court, for example, cannot appeal to 
fundamental or immutable constitutional principles to place doctrinal limits on the 
supremacy of EU law in the same way the GFCC and other national courts have. 
This limitation, obviously, does not apply to the French Constitutional Council. 
Yet the French institution’s agenda-setting power is subject to strict limitations. A 
recent constitutional revision has expanded the Council’s review powers, by 
introducing a form of concrete review in a system that hitherto allowed 
constitutional challenges only against statutes awaiting promulgation.47 
                                                     
47 Arthur Dyevre, The Melki Way: The Melki Case and Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
French Judicial Politics (But Were Afraid to Ask), CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE 
(Catherine Van de Heyning & Maartje de Visser, 2012). 
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Nonetheless, the Council’s operating radius remains severely constrained by the 
restrictive character of the existing review mechanisms and the fact that ordinary 
citizens lack standing to file constitutional cases. For this reason, French 
constitutional judges cannot be sure a case will be brought in timely fashion for 
them to take a stance on the EU issue of the day. When it comes to monitoring 
the pace and direction of legal integration, they thus appear to be in a much 
weaker position than their German counterparts. Even if they wanted to follow 
the example of the GFCC and confront the Court of Justice by issuing non-
compliance threats, their credibility would be undermined by the Council’s 
procedural limitations.  
The CCC falls somewhere between these two extremes. The Czech Court is 
not held back by tight procedural constraints as is the French Constitutional 
Council. But it neither commands the same support at home, nor projects the 
same influence abroad as the GFCC. So, seen from the CJEU’s standpoint, the 
cost of an escalated constitutional crisis with the CCC is not nearly as high. 
Furthermore, in handling the pension case, which led it to declare the CJEU 
Landtová ruling ultra vires, the CCC made the crucial mistake of choosing an issue 
on which there was no consensus at domestic level. The bone of contention was 
Article 20 of the C-S Agreement – the special agreement concluded by the two 
States that emerged from the break-up of Czechoslovakia to settle the pension 
issue. Article 20 stipulated that the applicable scheme and the authority competent 
to grant pensions would be determined by the State of residence of the employer 
at the time of the dissolution. This criterion entailed that someone who had never 
set foot in the Slovak part of the defunct federation, but whose employer resided 
in the Slovak part, would receive her pension check (or whatever proportion 
thereof) from Slovakia. Throughout the 1990s, the meagre Slovak pensions 
remained significantly below those paid in the Czech Republic. This led to a series 
of disputes, culminating in a CCC judgment that ruled Article 20 
unconstitutional.48 The CCC ordered the Czech authorities to pay a special 
increment to Czech citizens in order to compensate for their low Slovak pensions. 
The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC), however, never accepted the CCC’s 
position. This triggered a domestic guerre des juges that has been dragging on for 
years. Indeed, before its 31 January 2012 ruling, the CCC had already delivered no 
less than 16 decisions on the matter! The CCC kept reasserting its jurisprudence. 
But the SAC persisted in refusing to back down.49 
Following the European Court’s decision in Landtová, which found that the 
special increment enacted by the CCC contravened the Coordination Regulation 
on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of nationality, Czech politicians 
did not rally to the CCC, as its judges might have hoped. Instead, the Czech 
Parliament passed a bill that prospectively abolished the special increment for all 
                                                     
48 Judgment of 3 June 2003, II. ÚS 405/02, Slovak Pensions I.  
49 See Komárek, supra note 1. 
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nationals, Czech or not, in line with the CJEU ruling.50 Meanwhile, the SAC, 
which justifiably felt vindicated by the CJEU’s preliminary ruling, still had to hand 
over its decision on the merits and decide whether Mrs Landtová would keep her 
special increment. The CJEU ruling did not preclude paying the increment to 
those who already enjoyed it.51 However, the SAC reasoned that, since the CCC 
had created the special increment in violation of EU law, its pension case law 
could not bind ordinary courts.52 The outcome, which also meant that Mrs 
Landtová would lose her special increment, infuriated the Czech constitutional 
judges. Nevertheless, when the pension issue came back before the CCC and on 
the day that saw it announce its ultra vires declaration, the Court found itself 
uncomfortably isolated. So much so that the odds of its ultra vires decision being 
actually enforced look very slim. In principle, the case is remanded to the SAC for 
further proceedings in accordance with the CCC’s pronouncements. But it is hard 
to see any reason why the SAC would now acquiesce. Overall, it seems that the 
CCC’s move will probably do more to harm its own institutional standing than to 
undermine the Court of Justice’s authority. The nuclear bomb the Czech judges 
intended to drop on the Court of Justice apparently ended up exploding in their 
own hands. 
Another implication of the foregoing game-theoretic analysis is especially 
relevant to domestic judicial superpowers like the GFCC. Again, this point has a 
Cold War parallel. Indeed, just as nuclear superpowers may realise that 
conventional weapons are more flexible and therefore easier to put to use, a 
mighty domestic court may want to lower the stakes of a showdown with the 
Court of Justice by choosing a low-profile issue or a less destructive form of 
defiance. By lowering the costs ensuing from an escalated constitutional crisis, a 
domestic court may make the usage of the non-compliance option more flexible 
and therefore more credible. If the expected gain from confrontation remains 
sufficiently high, the domestic court may even manage to escape, if only for a 
moment, the implacable logic of the Hawk-Dove game.53 This line of reasoning 
apparently underpinned a piece Roman Herzog, both former federal President and 
former President of the Karlsruhe Court, published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung in September of 2008.54 Entitled ‘Stop the ECJ’, the article pointed the 
finger at what it viewed as the Court of Justice’s increasing tendency to behave like 
a super-legislature grabbing ever greater competences. More to the point, though, 
Herzog urged the GFCC to rein in the Luxembourg Court’s activism by 
pronouncing the latter’s ruling in the Mangold case ultra vires. The Mangold 
                                                     
50 Act No. 428/2011 Coll.. See Slovak Pensions XVII, part IX.  
51 See Landtová, supra note 2, paragraph 53. 
52 SAC, judgment of 25 August 2011, 3 Ads 130/2008 – 204.  
53 This would imply: 

  −. (The domestic court prefers constitutional crisis to acquiescence.) 
54 Roman Herzog, Stoppt Den EuGh, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2008). 
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judgment55 pertained to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age and 
its application pending the transposition of Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 (Antidiscrimination Directive). In 2002, the centre-left coalition 
then in power in Germany had lowered the age limit at which employees and 
employers could enter into temporary contracts from 58 to 52. Aimed at 
bolstering the employment opportunities of older workers, the new law gave 
employers a measure of flexibility in an otherwise rigid labour market. 
Accordingly, a 53-year old worker could have her fixed-term contract renewed an 
indefinite number of times without ever being offered a permanent position. This 
apparently contravened the Antidiscrimination Directive, which precluded 
discrimination among workers on account of age. Yet there were two reasons to 
think that the Antidiscrimination Directive and the German legislation were fully 
compatible. For one, Article 6(1) of the directive provided that „differences of 
treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the 
context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate 
aim, including legitimate employment policy‟. For another, Member States had 
until December 2003 to transpose the directive and could claim an additional 3 
years extension.56 As Germany made use of the extension, the deadline for 
transposition was put off to 2 December 2006. So, when, in November 2005, the 
Court of Justice was about to announce preliminary its ruling in the case brought 
by the 56-year old Werner Mangold, it was expected that the Luxembourg Court 
would stop short of finding the German legislation in breach of EU law. 
All the same, the European Court held that the German employment scheme 
constituted unacceptable age discrimination. Brushing aside the objection that a 
directive whose transposition period had not expired could not possibly bind a 
Member State, the Court of Justice took the view that the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age enunciated by the Antidiscrimination Directive 
was a general principle of community law. The principle was supposed to have its 
source „in various international instruments and in constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States‟.57 Not surprisingly, the ruling and the somewhat 
offhand justification offered by the European Court attracted considerable 
criticism in Germany.58 But what really matters for the point I am trying to make 
here is that by the time Herzog’s article appeared in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung the policy issue raised by the Mangold case was, for all intents and purposes, 
moot. Because the Antidiscrimination Directive was now in force, the uniform 
application of EU law was not at risk, should the GFCC proceed to declare the 
Mangold ruling ultra vires. In other words, Mangold provided the GFCC with an 
opportunity to defy the Court of Justice at a much lower constitutional cost. This 
did not escape Herzog’s attention. He remarked that a ultra vires declaration by the 
                                                     
55 Decision of 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm. 
56 See Antidiscrimination Directive, Article 18. 
57 See supra note 52, Paragraph 74. 
58 See LÜDER GERKEN ET AL., “MANGOLD” ALS AUSBRECHENDER RECHTSAKT (2009). 
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GFCC would be ‘acceptable’ because the ‘Directive was now in force’ and, for this 
reason, the declaration ‘would not have any lasting impact on the unity of the EU 
legal system’.59 
 
 
 
IV. CREDIBLE AND NON-CREDIBLE THREATS OF NON-
COMPLIANCE: THE ITERATED SIGNALLING GAME 
 
This Section takes a closer look at judicial signalling – what legal scholars 
commonly discuss under the more capacious term of ‘judicial dialogue’60 – and 
seeks to identify the conditions under which domestic non-compliance threats 
may really influence the behaviour of the Court of Justice even if they are not 
subsequently carried out. For this purpose, I present a slightly more complex 
model in which the Court of Justice interacts with a domestic court in iterated 
fashion. After laying out the model, I discuss one possible equilibrium of the 
game, which I call – yet again in allusion to Cold War international politics – 
“coexistence” or “containment” equilibrium. I contend that this equilibrium may 
constitute a good approximation of CJEU-GFCC relations. I also consider other 
equilibria and how they might explain the behaviour of less powerful courts. As 
before, I do my utmost to keep equations and formulas to a minimum. 
 
A. THE MODEL 
 
The Hawk-Dove model presented in the previous section certainly offers an 
eminently tractable and in many ways illuminating account of EU judicial politics. 
But it nonetheless remains a very stylised representation of the jurisprudence of 
constitutional conflict. So I introduce several modifications to arrive at a more 
accurate picture of reality. 
The first follows from the observation that domestic and supranational 
judges, like countries on the world stage, do not interact in one-shot fashion but 
do so repeatedly. Judges have a history of past interactions and know they are 
likely to interact again in the future (interactions do not have a finite horizon). 
This matters because repetition fundamentally transforms the nature of 
                                                     
59 Herzog, supra note 54. Another way for superpowers to lower the ante is to avoid direct 
confrontation and, instead, fight each other through proxy wars, as the US and the USSR did 
on several occasions during the Cold War. The speech of the GFCC’s President, Andreas 
Vosskuhle, before the legislature of Hessen on 1 March 2012, may quite plausibly be analysed 
as an attempt to apply this strategy in the context of European judicial politics. In discussing 
the GFCC’s role as guardian of Germany’s statehood, Vosskuhle praised the CCC’s decision as 
a ‘healthy’ development to rein in the CJEU’s ‘expansionary’ impulses, in an apparent attempt 
to exploit the Czech precedent in the GFCC’s own struggle with the European Court.  
60 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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interaction. When a game is repeated an infinite number of times, outcomes that 
would not form a stable equilibrium in a one-shot interaction suddenly become 
possible. Repetition means a player can condition his behaviour on what the other 
player has done in previous rounds. This in turn makes it possible to punish or to 
reward the opponent for what she has done in the past. At the same time, and to 
the extent that the players care about future payoffs, the mere threat to punish 
may suffice to induce cooperation and prevent unilateral deviation from what 
would otherwise be an unstable outcome. The shadow of the future, as it were, 
thus becomes an effective means to enforce equilibria that would not be 
sustainable in a one-shot game. 
A further consideration involves the assumption of incomplete information. 
The Hawk-Dove game I described above presumes complete information. Every 
outcome is associated with specific costs and benefits for the players and the exact 
value of the courts’ payoffs is presumed to be public knowledge. In other words, 
each court knows exactly, and for every outcome, how much the other court will 
gain or lose. More realistically, though, courts do not always have complete 
information about the exact cost judges sitting on the opposite judicial body 
associate with a constitutional crisis or about the extent to which they value 
jurisdictional expansion. One way to model this is to assume that a court can be of 
two types: a dovish type, who associates a constitutional crisis with a very high 
cost and/or jurisdictional expansion with a lower gain, and a hawkish type, who 
associates a constitutional crisis with a relatively lower cost and/or jurisdictional 
expansion with a higher payoff. The hawkish type, as it has less to lose from a 
constitutional crisis and/or more to win from jurisdictional expansion, will be 
relatively more willing to risk an escalated confrontation. Knowing this, the other 
court, insofar as it is of a more dovish type, should have relatively more incentives 
to back down. Yet incomplete information implies that, though each court knows 
its own type, it does not know the other’s type with certainty and must therefore 
act on the basis of what it believes most probable.  
We really get to the crux of the matter – judicial signalling – when we 
introduce the possibility of communication. This can be conceptualised by 
allowing the players to signal their type before making a move. A player may do so 
honestly or dishonestly. Presumably, a hawkish type should want to signal its true 
type, either to avert a constitutional crisis or to force an equilibrium more 
favourable to her own interests on an opponent believed to be dovish. On the 
other hand, a dovish court may be tempted to lie about its true type and signal 
hawkishness. Communication can be modelled in two ways. Modelling 
communication as costly signal means that producing the signal directly affects the 
sender’s payoffs. The other way to model it is as cost-free signal – “cheap talk” in 
game-theoretic jargon. This implies that producing the signal does not directly 
affects the sender’s payoffs, although it may affects the players’ choices and thus, 
indirectly, their payoffs. 
In the international relations literature, formal models based on these 
ingredients have been used to identify the conditions under which signalling is 
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likely to be credible and when a state will have incentives to be honest or, on the 
contrary, to bluff.61 It has been demonstrated, in particular, that even when a 
signal is not itself costly (thus fitting the definition of cheap talk), it may 
nonetheless provide an effective deterrence tool when a State has built a 
reputation for honesty.62 Under certain circumstances, bluffing may also work. But 
a State that is caught bluffing – as China was over Taiwan in its confrontation with 
the United States in 195063 – may earn a reputation for bluff. As a result, its signal 
will lack credibility and will be ignored by other States. This means in turn that a 
State with a reputation for bluffing will be incapable of using signalling to avert a 
war, even when it is ready to fight, as exemplified by the Chinese failure to avoid 
military escalation in the Korean peninsula.64 
I believe the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict may be modelled along 
similar lines. The game tree depicted in Figure 4 represents a one-period 
interaction in the infinitely repeated game. It starts with the Court of Justice’s 
attempting to enlarge its jurisdiction. The Domestic Court then responds to this 
move either by threatening to disapply some EU law or by remaining silent.65 The 
Court of Justice must then decide whether to maintain or to abandon its activist 
jurisprudence. In case it chooses to press on with its expansionary jurisprudence, 
the last move rests with the Domestic Court to disapply some EU law or to 
acquiesce. Whenever the end of a branch of the game tree is reached, the stage 
game ends and a new period begins. The iterated game consists of an infinite 
number of repetitions of this base game. 
 
 
                                                     
61 See Sartori, The Might of the Pen, supra note 35; Anne E. Sartori, Hawks, Doves, and Diplomats: 
Reputation and Communication in a Modified Hawk-Dove Game (2001), available at 
http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4760/Sartori4-13.pdf; James D. Morrow, Capabilities, 
Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 941–
972 (1989). 
62 Sartori, The Might of the Pen, supra note 35. 
63 Id. at 139. 
64 Id. at 137–140. 
65 For the sake of simplicity and because I am primarily interested in the use of signalling by 
domestic judicial actors, the model only considers communication by the Domestic Court. 
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A court can be of two types. The more hawkish type associates jurisdictional 
expansion or reassertion with a high gain (noted ) but also jurisdictional retreat 
with a high loss (−). The more dovish court, meanwhile, associates expansion 
with a low jurisdictional gain ( , with  < ) but also jurisdictional retreat with a 
smaller loss (− , with −  ). As before, when both courts refuse to acquiesce, 
each receives half the jurisdictional resource it was fighting for and incurs the cost 
of an escalated constitutional crisis (
!"#
  for the hawkish type and 
$"#
  for the 
dovish type). The courts have no persistent type and a court’s type may change in 
each period with probability 

. This assumption is meant to reflect the view that 
judicial preferences may vary from issue to issue as well as over time following 
changes in judicial personnel. At the beginning of a period, a court knows only its 
own type. Once the period is over, though, the courts can observe each other’s 
type.66 The Domestic Court can thus observe which type the Court of Justice 
                                                     
66 This assumption is arguably a simplification. In the course of real-world interactions, judges are 
likely to learn something about each other’s preferences but not everything. 
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Figure 4. Signalling Domestic Judicial Defiance, Stage Game. 
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really was and the Court of Justice can verify whether the Domestic Court 
signalled its real type or bluffed. Here communication is modelled as cheap talk. 
Producing the signal “Threaten” does not per se affect the Domestic Court’s 
payoffs (nor does it affect the Court of Justice’s for that matter), although, under 
certain conditions, as we shall see, the signal may be credible enough for the Court 
of Justice to pay attention to it and revise its beliefs about the Domestic Court’s 
preferences accordingly. 
 
B. THE ‘COEXISTENCE’ OR ‘CONTAINMENT’ EQUILIBRIUM 
 
What is the optimal way to play this game? As with any infinite-horizon game, 
there are many possible equilibria in our inter-court game.67 Yet not all are equally 
plausible empirically. Much depends on the players’ initial expectations.68 Under 
certain conditions, the following strategy profiles constitute a plausible coexistence 
or containment equilibrium69: 
 
Court of Justice: 
If type = dovish: If period t = 1, play ‘Maintain jurisdictional expansion’ 
if Domestic Court does not threaten, otherwise play 
‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
If period t > 1 and no court has been caught deviating 
from equilibrium:  
Play ‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’ if Domestic 
Court does not threaten and last time two courts were 
the same type you played ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’, or if Domestic Court says ‘Threaten’; 
Play ‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’ if last time two 
courts were the same type you played ‘Reverse 
Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
If Domestic Court has been caught deviating from 
equilibrium, play ‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
If you have been caught deviating from equilibrium, 
play ‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
 
If type = hawkish: If period t = 1, play ‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’ 
                                                     
67 This follows from the so-called “Folk Theorem”, see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, 
GAME THEORY 150 (1991). 
68 These expectations, arising from formal or informal norms, may identify one particular 
equilibrium as a ‘focal point’, a term coined by THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT 57 (1960). 
69 In the jargon of game theory, the solution concept applied here is called a ‘Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibrium’, for it implies that the players rationally update their beliefs according to Bayes’ 
rule. 
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whether or not Domestic Court threatens. 
If period t > 1 and no court has been caught deviating 
from equilibrium:  
Play ‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’ if Domestic 
Court does not threaten or if last time two courts were 
the same type you played ‘Reverse Jurisdictional 
Expansion’; 
Play ‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’ if Domestic 
Court says ‘Threaten’ and last time the two courts were 
the same type you played ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’. 
If Domestic Court has been caught deviating from 
equilibrium, play ‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’; 
If you have been caught deviating from equilibrium, 
play ‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
 
Domestic Court: 
If type = dovish: If period t = 1, don’t threat and if Court of Justice plays 
‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’, play ‘Don’t 
Disapply EU Law’. 
If period t > 1 and no court has been deviating from 
equilibrium:  
Don’t threat; 
Play ‘Don’t Disapply EU Law’ if Court of Justice plays 
‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
If Court of Justice has been caught deviating from 
equilibrium: 
Say ‘Threaten’; 
If Court of Justice plays ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’, play ‘Disapply EU Law’. 
If you have been caught deviating from equilibrium: 
Say ‘Threaten’ with probability 

, don’t threat with 
probability 

; 
If Court of Justice plays ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’, play ‘Don’t Disapply EU Law’. 
 
If type = hawkish: If period t = 1: 
Say ‘Threaten’; 
Play ‘Don’t Disapply EU Law’ if Court of Justice plays 
‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’. 
If period t > 1 and no court has been caught deviating 
from equilibrium:  
Play ‘Don’t Disapply EU Law’ if  Court of Justice plays 
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‘Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion’ and last time two 
courts were the same type the Court of Justice played 
‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’; 
Play ‘Reverse Jurisdictional Expansion’ if Domestic 
Court says ‘Threaten” and last time the two courts were 
the same type you played “Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’. 
If Court of Justice has been caught deviating from 
equilibrium: 
Say ‘Threaten’; 
If Court of Justice plays ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’, play ‘Disapply EU Law’; 
If you have been caught deviating from equilibrium: 
Say ‘Threaten’ with probability 

, don’t threat with 
probability 

; 
If Court of Justice plays ‘Maintain Jurisdictional 
Expansion’, play ‘Don’t Disapply EU Law’. 
 
This equilibrium corresponds to a situation where the two courts accommodate 
each other’s existence by trading issues. The court that cares more about the issue 
() gets its way and the court that cares less ( ) acquiesces. When the two courts 
are of the same type, each court alternatively gets its way, i.e. if the Court of 
Justice gets to play ‘Maintain’, it must play ‘Reverse’ the next time the courts are of 
the same type. In equilibrium, along the path of play, constitutional crises never 
occur and the only outcomes that are observed are A, B and D, E in Figure 4. As 
long as no court is caught deviating from the equilibrium path, the Domestic 
Court’s signal allows the courts to coordinate each other’s moves.70 Because the 
Domestic Court expects to benefit from the trading of issues, it always tells the 
truth about its type. If it lied, saying ‘Threaten’ when in truth its type is dovish, the 
Court of Justice would observe it at the end of the period. From then on, the 
Court of Justice would stop listening to the signal,71 would always maintain its 
expansionary judicial stance and no trading of issues would take place.  
What conditions must hold to sustain this equilibrium? First, and most 
evidently, the courts must prefer a single-period jurisdictional loss to a single-
                                                     
70 At the beginning of each period, the Court of Justice believes that there is a 50 per cent chance 
that the Domestic Court is hawkish and a 50 per cent chance that it is dovish. When the 
Domestic Court announces “Threaten”, though, the Court of Justice updates its beliefs 
respectively to 0 and 100 per cent, while, conversely, the absence of signal prompts the Court 
of Justice to revise its beliefs to respectively 100 and 0 per cent. 
71 As a result, the Domestic Court would be indifferent between signalling and not signalling 
hawkishness. It is why it threatens with probability 

 and does not threaten with probability 

. 
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period constitutional crisis (
$
 <
!"#
 < − < − ). Second, the courts must 
care at least a middling amount about the future. This means that the expected 
payoff from complying now and in the future must be greater than the expected 
payoff from deviating now and enduring the consequences in the future.72  For the 
Domestic Court, the temptation to lie about its type when it is dovish seems the 
most obvious incentive compatibility constraint. Since the hawkish type gets its 
way more often,73 the dovish type may want to say “Threaten” to obtain payoff 
( ) and avoid cost (− ).74 This, however, must be balanced against the future loss 
resulting from a reputation for bluff. Therefore, a necessary condition for 
sustainability is that the expected dividend of a reputation for honesty outweighs 
the immediate reward from lying.75 Third, the strategy profiles must also satisfy a 
credible punishment condition. This means that whenever a court is caught 
deviating the other court must be willing to enforce punishment. When the court 
caught deviating is the Domestic Court, this condition is easily satisfied: the Court 
of Justice always plays “Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion” and has no incentive 
to deviate from this course of action. It is when the court caught deviating is the 
Court of Justice that things get a little trickier. Indeed, for punishment to be 
credible the Domestic Court must be willing to play “Disapply EU law” in case 
the Court of Justice persists in playing “Maintain Jurisdictional Expansion”. That 
is, the Domestic Court must be willing to incur the cost of a full-blown 
constitutional crisis, even though, were it only for the current period, it would be 
better off acquiescing (remember: 
$
 <
!"#
 < − < − ). Thus the 
requirement is that the expected future payoffs from enforcing punishment 
                                                     
72 If % (% ∈ 0,1)) denotes the judges’ discount factor, the rate at which they discount future 
payoffs, the Continuation Value of Compliance (()*+ ,-.(/) is captured by: 0 

1  +

3  +

3  −

1  −

3  −

3 . The Continuation Value of Non-Compliance 
(.).()*+ ,-.(/) for the court caught deviating is: 0 −

  −

  . (The court caught 
deviating always acquiesces). 
73 In period t > 1, the hawkish court gets its way whenever the other court’s type is dovish in 
addition to 50 per cent of the time when the other court is also hawkish. The dovish type, by 
contrast, get its way only half the time when the other court is also dovish. Note that in period 
t = 1 the dovish Domestic Court never gets its way. 
74 When, in period t > 1, no court has been caught deviating and the last time the two courts 
were of the same type the Court of Justice got its way, the dovish Domestic Court’s single-
period net expected gain from lying over telling the truth is: 

  +

  −

  +

  =  . If t = 
1 or the last time the two courts were of the type the Domestic Court got its way, the net 
expected gain is: 

  −

  −

  −

  = − . 
75 More formally, in current period t > 1, if no court has been caught deviating and the last time 
the two courts were of the same type the Court of Justice got its way – the circumstances 
under which the temptation to lie is strongest – the following inequality must hold for the 
dovish Domestic Court:	  −

  + ()*+ ,-.(/ > 

  +

  + .).()*+ ,-.(/. 
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overweigh the cost of a constitutional crisis in the current period so that the 
Domestic Court prefers punishing to acquiescence.76 
  
THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE EUROPEAN COURT: 
CONTAINING THE EXPANSION OF EU LAW 
 
This coexistence equilibrium seems to provide a plausible characterisation of the 
relationship the CJEU has developed with the GFCC. In evolving its rich case law 
on European integration, which now spans more than four decades, the German 
Court has alternated conciliatory statements with tough talk. It has threatened to 
disapply EU acts on numerous occasions. Yet it has never put its threat to 
execution. To many legal scholars, this is proof that the GFCC is a dog that barks 
but never bites, and that its non-compliance threats cannot have any influence 
whatsoever on the CJEU.77 The analysis presented here, however, suggests that 
this view is quite possibly wrong. Indeed, far from demonstrating that the GFCC’s 
barking is mere “babble”, our game-theoretic analysis implies that the absence of 
constitutional crises may in fact be an indication that the GFCC has enjoyed a 
good measure of success in containing the CJEU’s expansionary impulses. 
The first bouts of tension with the Court of Justice go back more than four 
decades. In its first Solange decision, the GFCC announced that as long as the 
European Economic Communities (EEC) lacked a proper bill of rights, it would 
review the measures enacted by EEC institutions to ensure they do not fall below 
the human rights standards of the German Constitution.78 As is well known, no 
European act was found to violate these standards. But the Court of Justice soon 
began to work actively on the development of a human rights jurisprudence. In 
1986, twelve years after its first Solange decision, the GFCC declared that it was 
satisfied with the progress made by EEC institutions on the human rights front 
and that it would not exercise its power to review European laws as long as the 
level of fundamental rights protection at supranational level remained equivalent 
to that guaranteed at the domestic level.79 While demonstrating that a domestic 
judicial body could influence the development of European law, these decisions 
are also widely credited for spurring the Court of Justice to take fundamental 
                                                     
76 The .).()*+ ,-.(/  for the punishing court corresponds to: 0 

  +

  . (The punishing 
court always gets it way, irrespective of its type.) Hence, the credible punishment condition for 
the punishing Domestic Court is captured by: 

0 

  +

   − 5
$
 5 > − . (This is for the 
dovish Domestic Court. For the hawkish Domestic Court the condition is easier to satisfy, 
since acquiescence is more costly and constitutional crisis less so.) 
77 Christoph U. Schmid, All Bark No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s “Banana 
Decision,” 7 EUR. L. J. 95 (2001). 
78 Decision of 29 May 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271. 
79 Decision of 22 October. 1986, 73 BVerfGE  339. 
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rights more seriously.80 Remarkably, the GFCC achieved this without pressing the 
big red button. 
After a period of accelerated integration following the adoption of the Single 
European Act,81 tensions flared up again during the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. A judge well-known for its Eurosceptic positions, Paul Kirchoff, was 
designated as rapporteur for the case brought against the statute authorising 
ratification. Kirchoff, soon to become the bête noire of pro-integration academics,82 
wrote an opinion full of threats and warnings, some veiled others explicit, directed 
at the European legislative bodies and at the Court of Justice in particular. After 
cautioning Brussels and Luxemburg that ‘Treaty interpretation should not amount 
to Treaty revision’, it went on to spell out the GFCC’s now famous ultra vires 
doctrine,83 which has since then served as inspiration for many other high courts 
throughout the EU. In any case, at a time when public attitudes towards the great 
European project were already souring, the ruling sent a shockwave through the 
EU legal order. So it is hardly surprising that the apparent self-restraint displayed 
by the Court of Justice in the 1990s has been linked to the GFCC’s Maastricht 
ruling.84 
The GFCC’s Banana decision85 at the turn of the Millennium marked a return 
to détente. This interlude proved relatively short-lived, however. In the wake of 
the 2004 enlargement, the Court of Justice produced a series of judgments that 
sparked considerable controversy in Germany and elsewhere.86 The pressure was 
again mounting between the two judicial superpowers. On the eve of the GFCC’s 
ruling on the Lisbon Treaty, tensions had reached unprecedented levels, inviting 
comparison with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similar to judge Paul Kirchoff in 
Maastricht, judge Udo di Fabio, who had also been rapporteur in the GFCC ruling 
on the European Arrest Warrant,87 was there to lend extra credibility to the 
Court’s hawkish posturing. The language of the decision he penned, with its 
strong sovereigntist overtones, was clearly a signal of defiance addressed to the 
CJEU.88 While stressing the structural limits placed by the German Constitution 
on the integration process, it flagged a handful of policy areas as core domestic 
competences that had to remain in the hands of German legislators.89 
                                                     
80 Weiler & Haltern, supra note 46, at 446; STONE SWEET, supra note 22, at 87–90; ULRICH R. 
HALTERN, EUROPARECHT: DOGMATIK IM KONTEXT 472 (2007). 
81 See Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, supra note 11. 
82 See Joseph Weiler, The State “Über Alles”: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH EVERLING 1651 (Ole Due, 1995). 
83 Decision of 12 October 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155. 
84 See RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
INTEGRATION (1998). 
85 Decision of 7 June 2000, 102 BVerfGE 147. 
86 See Arthur Dyevre, The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics, 34 W. 
EUR. POLITICS 346–361 (2011). 
87 Decision of 18 July 2005, BVerfGE 113, 273. 
88 Decision of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE 123, 267. 
89 Id. para. 253-260 
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For want of a full-scale empirical investigation, it is hard to establish with the 
required certainty whether the GFCC’s Lisbon ruling really forced the CJEU into 
retreat. In light of the reactions and criticism its ruling has attracted,90 the GFCC 
would seem to have successfully emulated President Kennedy’s cautious firmness 
in confronting the Soviet Union over the Cuban Crisis. On the other hand, 
Kücükdeveci, delivered less than a year after the German Court’s landmark ruling, 
seemed to be an unequivocal confirmation of the doctrinal position articulated by 
the Luxembourg Court in Mangold.91 This would suggest the CJEU took the 
GFCC’s signal to be bluff and decided to ignore it. 
At any rate, just one year after its Lisbon ruling, the GFCC rendered its 
Honeywell  decision.92 In an opinion whose appeasing tone stood in sharp contrast 
to Lisbon’s belligerence, the GFCC held that Mangold was not an ultra vires act. 
Under the assumption that the Court of Justice really believed the GFCC’s signal 
in Lisbon and did not subsequently   change its mind, Honeywell would simply be 
issue-trading going on – the judicial equivalent of President Kennedy’s promise, as 
part of the resolution of the Cuban Crisis, not to invade Cuba and to withdraw US 
nuclear warheads from Turkey. The alternative interpretation would be that the 
GFCC was caught bluffing in Lisbon, as China was over Taiwan in 1950, and had 
little choice but to acquiesce. This would imply that the courts are now in the part 
of the coexistence equilibrium where the Court of Justice no longer listens to the 
Domestic Court and the Domestic Court is punished for deviating.93 
 
 ALTERNATIVE EQUILIBRIUM, WEAK DOMESTIC COURTS AND KARLSRUHE’S 
NUCLEAR UMBRELLA 
 
Leaving aside the (empirical) question as to whether Lisbon and Honeywell 
represented a failure or a triumph in the GFCC’s containment jurisprudence, less 
powerful national courts may face structural difficulties in trying to emulate its 
Maastricht ultra vires doctrine. 
To be sure, failing to communicate properly may not help the cause of 
domestic judges. Somewhat oddly, in the Czech story, when the SAC submitted a 
reference for a preliminary ruling in what was to become the Landtová judgment, 
the CCC sent a letter to the CJEU where it sought to explain its case law. Yet the 
Registry at the Court of Justice sent the letter back to the Czech constitutional 
                                                     
90 See the special issue of the GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2009) 10 (8). 
91 Judgment of 19 January 2010, C-555/07. 
92 Decision of 6 July 2010, BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06. 
93 In the above specification of the coexistence equilibrium, after a court is caught deviating, the 
other court punishes it forever and communication never works again. Admittedly, this is not a 
fully realistic assumption, as real-world actors, just as humans in experimental games, are more 
likely to “forgive” the deviant after a few rounds of punishment. Note, however, that the same 
equilibrium also exists, albeit for a smaller range of parameter values, when we assume that 
punishment only lasts for a finite number of periods. 
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judges in Brno stating that ‘according to what is established practice, the members 
of the CJEU do not exchange correspondence with third parties concerning the 
cases submitted to the CJEU’.94 This the Czech judges apparently found 
insulting.95 But for EU law practitioners the question would remain as to why they 
did not submit their own preliminary reference to the CJEU. The overall attitude 
of the Czech constitutional judges seemed to betray poor knowledge of the rules 
of procedure before the Court of Justice.96 
Even so, the relevance problem of the many domestic high courts that have 
been trying to mimic the GFCC’s containment jurisprudence probably runs deeper 
and it would be wrong to believe that better communication would suffice to 
resolve it. The problem with national courts such as the CCC is that their non-
compliance decisions may not be able to inflict sufficient damage on the Court of 
Justice to force it to back down.97 With respect to these courts, the supranational 
Court may simply prefer a constitutional crisis to a jurisdictional loss. The lack of 
superpower status thus presents the domestic judges with an asymmetric situation: 
they prefer acquiescence to war (
$
 <
!"#
 < − < − ), while the European 
Court prefers war to acquiescence (− < − $ <
!"#
 ). Under these 
conditions no containment equilibrium can be sustained and non-compliance 
threats are unlikely to carry much weight.98 In fact, knowing that non-compliance 
will achieve little and a constitutional crisis will be harmful for its own institutional 
standing than for the CJEU’s, a domestic court in such a situation is still better off 
acquiescing. 
For weak domestic courts, as for non-nuclear states during the Cold War, the 
GFCC may well represent the only realistic hope of containing the CJEU and of 
protecting their interests as higher courts. The German Court, of course, pursues 
its own agenda and may not care much about Slovak and Czech pensions and 
whether they are measly or generous. But, to some extent, the Karlsruhe Court 
may provide less powerful courts with a nuclear umbrella: the guarantee that the 
Court of Justice will not go too far, lest it faces a clash with the GFCC. To speak 
of a “Karlsruhe Pact” would push the Cold War analogy too far. Yet it is telling 
                                                     
94 Quoted from the judgment of the CCC, Slovak Pensions XVII, supra note 1 at 14.  
95 Id. 
96 See Komárek, supra note 1. 
97 Symptomatic of the difference of treatment between the GFCC and other domestic courts is 
the scant attention that has been given to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal decision, rendered 
as recently as November 2011, on the Brussels Regulation. Although the Polish Court did not 
rule the Regulation – a cornerstone of the EU civil jurisdiction cooperation system – 
unconstitutional, it nonetheless completed a thorough review on ultra vires grounds. See 
Judgment of 16 November 2011, No. SK 45/09, English translation at 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/SK_45_09_EN.pdf  (accessed 8 
June 2012) and Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 
12/1. 
98 For the Court of Justice always playing “Maintain jurisdictional expansion” is a dominant 
strategy, as it remains its best strategy regardless of the strategy played by the Domestic Court. 
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that the CCC, along with other constitutional courts, emphasised the similarities 
between its position and the position expounded by GFCC in its Solange and 
Maastricht decisions.99 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Those who fear a judicial Armageddon will take some comfort from experiments 
showing that the iterated Hawk-Dove game (here in its Snowdrift variant) leads to 
consistently higher levels of human cooperation than other iterated games such as 
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.100 As with superpowers during the Cold War, the 
threat of mutually assured destruction provides a strong incentive to cooperate. 
The analysis developed in this Article demonstrates that the same may well apply 
for the GFCC and the CJEU. As for the CCC’s ultra vires declaration, it warrants 
the conclusion that it is more likely to remain an isolated accident than to create a 
systemic threat for the EU legal system. With hindsight, the Czech constitutional 
judges may come to see their own decision as a slip of hand. 
Having said this, I should specify that I do not deny that potential systemic 
threats to the EU legal system do exist. But my view is that such threats are 
unlikely to come from the courts acting alone. As the analysis developed in the 
present Article makes clear, national courts are embedded in domestic politics. 
Public opinion and government parties matter; and their attitude towards 
integration determines in large part how much leeway is afforded to the judiciary. 
Here lies probably the biggest danger of disintegration for the EU legal system, 
especially in light of the current Euro-zone crisis. Were partisan consensus on EU 
membership to collapse – either because public opposition to membership came 
to reach such levels that existing parties would no longer be in position to support 
integration or because widespread discontent fuelled the emergence of new, anti-
EU government parties – Eurosceptic judges might feel safe enough to ignore the 
Court of Justice and with it the primacy of EU law.101 This is a real possibility, 
which would mark the end of legal integration and, arguably, of the European 
project as we know it today. 
 
                                                     
99 See Slovak Pensions XVII, supra note 1 at 10, Polish decision supra note 97 at 24 (citing the 
GFCC’s Honeywell ruling). 
100 See Rolf Kümmerli et al., Human Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Comparing the Snowdrift Game with 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 274 PROC. R. SOC. B. 2965–2970 (2007). 
101 As hinted above, this may have been the scenario in which the CCC thought it found itself. 
Many constitutional judges owed their appointment to the arch-Eurosceptic Czech President, 
Vaclav Klaus, and may have expected that the Czech government and legislators would 
support them against the CJEU, see Komárek, supra note 1. 
